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Abstract 
Recent research on contemporary modalities of Islamic or Muslim philanthropy has 
focused on processes of subjectivation through which givers and recipients of charity 
are habituated or craft themselves to an ethic of piety, social responsibility and 
(neoliberal) economic virtuosity. These studies, however, have concentrated almost 
exclusively on those who give charity, leading to an over-emphasis on the 
perspectives of givers, and on their role in determining how the poor might deal with 
their everyday lives and imagined futures.  As a result, small-scale gifting relations in 
which the Muslim poor may also be involved—making the poor simultaneously 
givers and recipients of charity—have been obscured or erased altogether. In this 
article we argue that the concerns of the poor might not always or necessarily be those 
of the wealthy donors of charity.  By receiving and giving sadaqa and zakat, poor and 
working class Muslim in a Colombo neighbourhood imagine inclusion and belonging 
to the wider Muslim community in Colombo which is not contingent upon the 
mediation and pedagogical interventions of charitable organizations and (middle-
class) pious donors. Importantly, this imagination of inclusion and belonging comes at 
a time when the Muslim poor are increasingly marginalized by virtue of a (middle 
class) discourse which by framing charity as a means ‘to help the poor to help 
themselves’ has turned socio-economic upliftment into an ethical duty, and, 
consequently, failure to improve oneself has become the symptom of wider moral 
shortcomings.  
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“The practice of zakat is not just intended to temporarily alleviate suffering. By 
demonstrating an example of virtue and duty, granting zakat encourages all members 
of society to work harder, to be compassionate, and to improve the lot of the 
community. Zakat is, therefore, both spiritual and profoundly social.”.2 With these 
words Tariq Cheema describes the scope of Islamic charity at a time when, “Muslim 
philanthropy is at a crossroads,” because, “it faces the challenge of building new, 
global models of giving, whilst refining the old methods embedded in Islam’s vibrant 
religious and cultural traditions.”3 Indeed such a reformist task is taken up by World 
Congress of Muslim Philanthropists of which Tariq Cheema is the founder and CEO.   
Established in 2007 by “a small group of dedicated individuals” it includes illustrious 
patrons such as, amongst others, H.R.H. Banderi A.R. Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia and 
H.R.H. El Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan.  
Tariq Cheema’s vision of a global Muslim philanthropic network devoted to turning 
religious giving into a means for socio-economic progress and development draws on 
a time-honoured Islamic tradition of almsgiving,4 and chimes with current debates 
within the Muslim world regarding the scope, direction and ethics of mandatory 
(zakat) and voluntary (sadaqa) almsgiving.5 Contemporary concerns about the 
inherent potentials of almsgiving have emerged at the intersection of a number of 
related, and simultaneously global and local processes of transformation. Research 
has indicated that many expressions of present-day social activism—of which 
contemporary forms of organized charity are an expression—are not only responsive 
to the weakening of state-sponsored social welfare programmes and a progressive 
Islamization of the social, but appear to be congruent with novel forms of capital 
accumulation engendered by global processes of economic liberalization.6  Here the 
                                                        
2
 T. Cheema, ‘The World Congress of Muslim Philanthropists: A strategic Approach to Strengthen 
Muslim Giving’, at www.thewcmp.org/img/downloads/pdf/Muslim_Philanthropy0.pdf (accessed 13th 
October 2015), p. 1.  
3
 Ibid. 
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 The importance of almsgiving has led Decobert to suggest that early Islam constituted an economie 
aumoniere, an economy sustained by the circulation of alms from the wealthy to the poor.  Likewise, 
Singer has argued that the extensive provision of assistance for the poor in the Ottoman empire was 
characteristic of a ‘welfare society.’. C. Décobert, Le mendiant et le combattant: l'institution de l'islam, 
Seuil, Paris,1991; A. Singer, Charity in Islamic societies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2008.  See also A. Sabra, Poverty and charity in medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt, 1250-1517, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000.  In modern Islamic political theology the most 
unambiguous interpretation of almsgiving as an instrument of social welfare is that of Abu al-Ala 
Maududi—the founder of founder of Jama’at Islam— in Economic system of Islam (Islamic 
Publications, Lahore, 1940).  
5
 See H. Dean and Z. Khan, ‘Muslim Perspectives on Welfare’, Journal of Social Policy, vol. 26, no. 2, 
1997, pp. 193-209; T. Kuran, ‘Islamic Redistribution through Zakat: Historical Record and Modern 
Realities’, in Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts, edited by M. Bonner, M. Ener, and A. 
Singer, 2003, pp. 275–93. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press; Singer Charity in Islamic 
societies; K. Retsikas, ‘Reconceptualising zakat in Indonesia: Worship, philanthropy and rights’, 
Indonesia and the Malay World, vol. 42, no. 124, 2014, pp. 337-357 
6
 Recent scholarship has identified and explored specific middle-class projects—oft coalescing around 
wealthy entrepreneurs—which draw together various strands of Islamic reformism, notions of 
community development and the demands of neoliberal capitalism.  See eg. P. Sloane, Islam, 
modernity and entrepreneurship among the Malays, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1999; A. Buğra, 
‘Labour, capital, and religion: harmony and conflict among the constituency of political Islam in 
Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 38, no. 2, 2002, pp. 187-204; J. Clark, Islam, charity and 
activism: middle-class networks in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
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orientations and practices of emerging modalities of social activism and organized 
charity articulate of a novel imagination of the relations between state, market and 
religiosity aptly glossed by some as ‘pious neoliberalism’.7  The stuff of 
contemporary modalities of (organized) Muslim religious giving—motivating middle 
class Muslims to donate time and money to redress failures of state and market in 
promoting the common good, or encouraging the poor to utilize charity they receive 
to transform themselves into economically active and pious Muslims—thus resonates 
with a global “ethicalization of market rule through humanitarianism, philanthropy, 
and the affect of poverty action” 8 in which neoliberal capitalism is both the problem 
and the condition for its solution.9 That is, the imagination of a moral economy 
engendered by charity, voluntarism and humanitarianism is located in the rhetoric, 
aesthetic and practices of the market itself, as expressed, for instance, by the practices 
of philanthrocapitalism.10  
Recent research on charity and philanthropy in the Muslim world and beyond has 
explored ways through which neoliberal market practices and ideologies have 
engendered new forms of religiosity, and, at the same time, how the latter have been 
mobilized to inform economic practice.  This two-way traffic has afforded a novel 
and productive perspective on the relations or affinities between religious and 
economic life beyond the all too obvious anthropological trope of the ‘moral 
economy’.11  If scholars in the 1990s had explored and theorized modernist 
objectifications of Islam as a religious “system,”12 current research on emerging 
forms of Islamic or Muslim philanthropy has shifted attention to processes of 
                                                                                                                                                              
2004; C. Tripp, Islam and the moral economy: the challenge of capitalism, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2006; L. Deeb, An enchanted modern: gender and public piety in Shi’i Lebanon, 
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Royal Anthropological Institute, vol. 15, no. S1, 2009, pp. S202-S221; D. Rudnyckyj, Spiritual 
economies: Islam, globalization, and the afterlife of development, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
2010; M. Atia, Building a house in heaven: Islamic charity in neoliberal Egypt, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2013; S. Tobin, Everyday Piety: Islam and Economy in Jordan, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 2016. 
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 Rudnyckyj Spiritual economies.  See also O. Karaman, ‘Urban neoliberalism with Islamic 
characteristics’, Urban Studies, vol. 50, no. 16, pp. 3412-3427; Atia Building a house in heaven; Tobin 
Everyday Piety. 
8
 A. Roy, ‘Ethical Subjects:   Market Rule in an Age of Poverty’, Public Culture, vol. 24, no. 1, 
p.107.   
9
 Typically in so-called bottom of the pyramid capitalism, see J. Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession: 
NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo, Duke University Press, Durham, 2005; J. 
Elyachar, ‘Next practices: Knowledge, infrastructure, and public goods at the bottom of the pyramid’, 
Public Culture, vol. 24, no. 1, 2012, pp. 109-129. 
10
 See eg. D. Rajak, In good company: An anatomy of corporate social responsibility, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2011. See also D. Fassin, Humanitarian reason: a moral history of the 
present, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2012; P. Redfield, ‘Bioexpectations: life technologies 
as humanitarian goods’, Public Culture, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 157-184. 
11
 The most remarkable example of this trend is Rudnyckyj Spiritual economies, but see also Tobin, 
Everyday Piety; Atia Building a house in heaven; J. Fischer, The halal frontier, Palgrave Macmillan, 
New York, 2011. 
12 D.F. Eickelman and J. Piscatori, Muslim politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996, p. 39.   
 4 
subjectivation through which givers and recipients of charity craft themselves to an 
ethic of piety, social responsibility and (neoliberal) economic virtuosity.13 All too 
often, though, we see in this literature a presumption that the ideals and aspirations of 
wealthy benefactors to create specific kinds of subjects of those who receive their 
charity is shared by the poor, and that efforts directed towards transforming the 
spiritual and material lives of (poor) recipients via religious giving have their intended 
effects.   
These assumptions might be unsurprising given that studies of Islamic and Muslim 
charity have single-mindedly focused on those who give charity,14 and as a result little 
is known about the experiences of recipients, and the relationships produced by the 
distribution of zakat and sadaqa.15  This has led to an over-emphasis on the 
perspectives of givers, and on their role in determining how the poor might deal with 
their everyday lives and imagined futures.  And as a result the subjectivation of the 
recipient-poor is routinely taken for granted, assumed as the inevitable outcome of 
socio-religious pedagogies of charitable interventions mobilized by the givers.  At the 
same time, small-scale gifting relations in which the Muslim poor may also be 
involved—making the poor simultaneously givers and recipients of charity—has 
remained substantially unexplored and under-theorized. By shifting focus on the life-
worlds of those who have become the object of the concern and intervention of 
charity-minded individuals and organizations this article, then, addresses some of the 
empirical and theoretical shortcomings in the anthropology of Islamic or Muslim 
charity.  We draw inspiration from the anthropology of giving in South Asia, to 
underscore the perhaps all too obvious fact that acts of charity, or giving more 
generally, might be understood very differently depending upon the position of those 
who participate in the exchange. 16 Moreover, we will argue that religious giving 
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 See, for instance, Atia Building a house in heaven; Tobin Everyday Piety.  See also Muehlebach’s 
study of voluntarism in northern Italy; A. Muehlebach, The moral neoliberal: welfare and citizenship 
in Italy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2012. 
14
 See eg. J. Benthall and J. Bellion-Jourdan, Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World, 
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 For an exception, see Kristen Ghodsee’s discussion of the intervention of international Islamic 
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ethnicity, and the transformation of Islam in postsocialist Bulgaria, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2009, pp. 130ff. 
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Asia, see A. Appadurai, ‘Gastro‐politics in Hindu South Asia.’ American ethnologist vol. 8, no. 3, 
1981, pp. 494-511: J. Parry, ‘The Gift, the Indian Gift and the “Indian gift”’, Man (n.s.) vol. 21, no. 3, 
1986, pp. 453-473; J. Parry, ‘On the Moral Perils of Exchange’, in Money and the Morality of 
Exchange, J. Parry and M. Bloch (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. P. 77ff.; G.G. 
Raheja, The Poison in the Gift: Ritual, Prestation, and the Dominant Caste in a North Indian Village, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988.  For a more recent critical appraisal of the debate, see M. 
Heim, Theories of the Gift in South Asia: Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain Reflections on Dana , Routledge, 
New York, 2004.  
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might be embedded in a relation between self and the divine entailing theological and 
aesthetic dispositions towards mercy, compassion or love which might be oblivious to 
the logic and practices of so-called pious neoliberalism..17   
Data for this paper were collected in Sri Lanka’s capital Colombo between 2012 and 
2013. Whilst in this Sinhala-Buddhist dominated island Muslims make up for roughly 
10% of the total population, they account for 36% of Colombo’s inhabitants (11% in 
the Colombo district as a whole).  The vast majority of Colombo (and Sri Lankan) 
Muslims are Sunni who follow the Shafi’i schools of jurisprudence, but there are also 
two other Muslim communities with origins in northern India, Memons and Bohras. 
Although their population is small, these two groups are extremely successful in 
commerce, from tea plantations and international trade to retail. There is no space 
here to summarize the rich history of Sri Lankan Muslims,18 but suffice it to say that 
they are a Tamil-speaking community whose Colombo-based middle-class elite rose 
to commercial prominence during the British colonial period, and later benefitted of 
the opportunities opened up by Sri Lanka’s adoption of a policy of economic 
liberalization in 1977.  However, the majority of Colombo Muslims continue to eke 
out a living in low paid precarious jobs, and populate inner-city low-income 
neighbourhoods such as Slave Island, Pettah and Maradana. Fieldwork was conducted 
at a time when Sinhala Buddhist xenophobia had led to virulent, and oft violent anti-
Muslim campaigns, making the Muslim minority increasingly anxious about its 
vulnerability, and sensitive to criticism alleged exclusive and inward orientation.19 
Muslims were accused of gaining unfair advantage over the Buddhist majority by 
                                                        
17
 T. Kochuyt, ‘God, gifts and poor people: On charity in Islam’, Social Compass, vol. 56, no. 1, 2012, 
pp. 98-116; C. Scherz, “‘Let Us Make God Our Banker”: Ethics, Temporality, and Agency in a 
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Disquieting Gifts: Humanitarianism in New Delhi, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2012; A. 
Mittermaier, ‘Beyond compassion: Islamic voluntarism in Egypt’, American Ethnologist, vol. 41, no. 3, 
2014, pp. 518-531. 
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 See  A. Ali, ‘The genesis of the Muslim community in Ceylon (Sri Lanka): a historical summary,’ 
Asian Studies, no. 19, 1981, pp. 65-82; M.M.M. Mahroof, ‘Community of Sri Lankan Malays: notes 
toward a socio‐historical analysis.’ Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs Journal, vol. 14, no. 1-2, 
1993, pp.143-155; V.C. De Munck, ‘Sufi, reformist and national models of identity: the history of a 
Muslim village festival in Sri Lanka,’ Contributions to Indian sociology, vol. 28, no. 2, 1994, pp. 273-
293; I.Qadri, ‘Unmooring identity: the antinomies of elite Muslim self-representation in modern Sri 
Lanka,’in P. Jeganathan and I. Qadri (eds.) Unmaking the Nation: the politics of identity and history in 
modern Sri Lanka, Social Scientists’ Association, Colombo, 1995, pp. 55-105; D. McGilvray, ‘Arabs, 
Moors and Muslims: Sri Lankan Muslim Ethnicity in Regional Perspective.’ Contributions to Indian 
Sociology vol 32, no. 2, 1998, pp. 433-483; D. McGilvray, Crucible of conflict: Tamil and Muslim 
society on the east coast of Sri Lanka , Duke University Press, Durham, 2008; M.A. Nuhman, Sri 
Lankan Muslims: ethnic identity within cultural diversity, International Centre for Ethnic Studies 
Colombo, Colombo, 2007. 
19
 See D. McGilvray,‘Sri Lankan Muslims: between ethno‐ nationalism and the global ummah’, 
Nations and Nationalism, vol. 17, no. 1, 2011, pp. 45-64; A. Ali, ‘Political Buddhism, Islamic 
Orthodoxy and Open Economy: The Toxic Triad in Sinhalese–Muslim Relations in Sri Lanka’, Journal 
of Asian and African Studies, vol. 49, no. 3, 2014, pp. 298-314; F. Haniffa, ‘Stories in the aftermath of 
Aluthgama.  In J.Holt (ed.) Buddhist Extremists and Muslim Minorities: Religious Conflict in 
Contemporary Sri Lanka, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.164-193; F. Hannifa, ‘Merit Economies 
in Neoliberal Times : Halal Troubles in Contemporary Sri Lanka,’ in D. Rudnyckyj and F. Osella (eds.) 
Religion and the Morality of the Market, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 116-137. 
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circulating economic resources within the community—Muslims, for instance, are 
chided for patronising only Muslim shops and restaurants, for investing in Muslim-
owned business, and so forth.  The extreme poles of wealth and poverty in the Sri 
Lankan Muslim community, alongside a growing sense of embattlement in the face of 
rising anti-Muslim Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, work to create and shape the senses 
of obligation on the part of the rich to give and of the rights of the poor to receive. 
Charity, Muslims and Islam in Colombo 
Rather the seeking to define Muslims’ almsgiving with reference to Islamic canon,20 
we begin by outlining the contours of the moral reasoning through which Colombo 
Muslims understand and practice giving zakat and sadaqa.21 We notice here a 
plurality of positions, but also a good deal of agreement across a socially diverse body 
of givers.  We have argued elsewhere22 that members and supporters of formal and 
informal Muslim or Islamic organizations that collect and distribute charity in the 
capital city and across the Island criticise the wastefulness of ‘traditional’ giving, oft 
caricatured as donation of cash to beggars during the month of Ramadan.  The 
argument here is that individual and indiscriminate giving not only reproduces 
dependency and encourages begging, but also does little to alleviate the root causes of 
poverty.23  On the contrary, the millions of rupees Muslim distribute every year as 
zakat and sadaqa could and should be pooled together and utilized to ‘help the poor to 
help themselves’, to engender substantial and permanent transformations in their 
lives.  Some, especially so-called ‘secular’ Muslims, justify such a move in terms of 
efficiency and efficacy, borne out both by the experience of the somewhat chaotic 
post-tsunami relief efforts, and by the need to uplift24 the community as a whole 
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 See eg. J. Benthall, Financial worship: the Quranic injunction to almsgiving’, Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute, vol. 5, no. 1, 1999, pp. 27-42; Retsikas,‘Reconceptualising zakat’. 
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 Central to Islamic orthopraxis, zakat has been linked to prayer, a religious obligation performed by 
giving a percentage of one’s wealth to specific categories of (Muslim) deserving recipients.  It is 
distinguished from voluntary almsgiving, sadaqa, albeit in the two words are often used 
interchangeably. Whilst it can be considered as a tax, and indeed historically it has often been collected 
alongside other taxes, zakat suggests notions of purification and increase. By giving a percentage of 
one’s wealth, the remainder is purified. Albeit the ultimate reward for one’s generosity is only 
experienced in the afterlife, the act of giving entails the promise of increased material prosperity and 
accumulation of religious merits. Whilst the incumbency of giving zakat normally falls only on those 
Muslims whose accumulated surplus during a full lunar year exceeds a certain threshold, sadaqa is not 
regulated by normative rules and can be given by anyone to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  See 
Benthall ‘Financial worship’; Atia Building a house in heaven p.14ff; T. Kuran, ‘Islamic redistribution 
through Zakat: Historical record and modern realities’, in M. Bonner, M. Ener, and A. Singer (eds.), 
Poverty and charity in Middle Eastern contexts, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 
2003, pp. 275–93; Singer Charity in Islamic societies. 
22
 F. Osella,  ‘“A Poor Muslim Cannot Be a Good Muslim”: Islam, Charitable Giving, and Market 
Logic in Sri Lanka,’ in D. Rudnyckyj and F. Osella (eds.) Religion and the Morality of the Market, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 217-239.  See also F. Osella , , R. Stirrat , and T. 
Widger, ‘Charity, Philanthropy and Development in Colombo, Sri Lanka ,’ in B. Morvaridi (ed.) New 
Philanthropy and Social Justice: Debating the Conceptual and Policy Discourse, Policy Press, Bristol, 
pp. 137– 156. 
23
 The latter are routinely identified as the outcome of lack of (religious and secular) education and 
skills, which, in turn, lead to unemployment, family instability, inability to plan life and defer 
gratification, promiscuity, criminality, and plain laziness. Osella ‘“A Poor Muslim”’; see also Atia 
Building a house in heaven. 
24
 Pan-South Asian idiom for the socio-economic enhancement of low status/class communities. 
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through systematic development projects.  For religious-minded Muslims who 
participate in the activities and funding campaigns of formal and informal charitable 
organizations—especially those close the Islamic reformism of groups such as 
Tablighi Jama`at and Jama’at Islam—the pragmatic discourse of development goes 
alongside an emphasis on the spiritual transformations which charity should elicit in 
recipients.  Here giving zakat is both a duty to God and to the Muslim community as a 
whole, a means to foster material and spiritual well-being amongst recipients.25  
Whether zakat as the right (haqq) of the recipients on a portion of the surplus of the 
donor should preclude conditions on its use or not,26 formal and informal charitable 
organizations have established systems of checks and references—often provided by 
local mosques or government employees—to ensure would-be-recipients’ ‘reputation’ 
as practicing Muslims and to establish their genuine economic needs.  Direct 
provision of adequate sanitation, drinking water or housing are preferred over 
individual cash transfers as the latter might be too easily ‘squandered’ by dissolute 
recipients. 
The practices of contemporary organizations devoted to the collection and distribution 
of Muslim charity in Colombo reveal an impetus toward individual and collective 
moral responsibilization seeking to shape the Muslim poor into self-disciplined 
economic and religious subjects.  This takes the configuration of an art of reforming 
and governing the poor which does not simply objectify theologies articulated within 
specific Islamic discursive traditions, but also draws on the legacy of colonial debates 
about the idleness of the (non-working) poor and the moral value of work; neoliberal 
notions of entrepreneurship and meritocracy; the global discourse of development; the 
charitable practices of other ethnic-religious communities in Sri Lanka;27 as well as 
on a growing middle-class uneasiness with the public spectacle of begging.  And yet, 
the enthusiasm for organized forms of charity we find amongst certain sections of the 
Colombo Muslim middle-class—in particular young professionals and MBA-
educated businessmen, that is those who participate more enthusiastically to, and have 
benefitted more from the liberalization of the Sri Lankan economy—and Islamic 
reformist organizations has a limited purchase.  Amongst our Colombo interlocutors 
the most common practice is to give a small proportion of one’s zakat and sadaqa  to 
charitable organizations, whilst utilizing the rest to respond to demands from poor 
relatives, dependants and strangers— not only beggars, but also those unable to meet 
expenses for medical emergencies, life-cycle rituals, education expenses or payment 
of utilities bills— as well as to support religious institutions.  Eventually, the impulse 
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 Reference is often made as much as to the times of the Prophet Muhammad and of the first four 
‘rightful’ Caliphs as exemplary of the virtues of centralized collection and distribution of zakat, as to 
the political theology of Sayyid Abul Al’a Maududi.  The founder of Jama’at Islam envisaged that 
zakat should be utilized in the service of piety and public welfare.  See M. Bonner, ‘Poverty and 
Economics in the Qur'an’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 35, no. 3, 2005, pp. 391-406; C. 
Décobert, Le Mendiant et le combatant: l’institution de l’Islam, Seuil, Paris, 1991; Kuran ‘Islamic 
redistribution’. 
26
 Osella ‘“A Poor Muslim”’; see also Retsikas ‘Reconceptualising zakat’. 
27 The relationality of religious practices across different ethnic-religious communities in Sri Lanka is 
underscored in Spencer et al. recent study of the dynamics of religiosity and conflict on the east coast 
of the island.  J. Spencer, J. Goodhand, H. Hasbullah, B. Klem, B. Korf, and T. de Silva, Checkpoint, 
Temple, Church and Mosque: A Collaborative Ethnography of War and Peace in Eastern Sri Lanka, 
Pluto, London, 2014, p. 20ff. See Osella et al. ‘Charity, Philanthropy and Development’ for a 
discussion of the circulation of charitable practices across different ethnic-religious communities in 
Colombo. 
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and obligation to give cannot be turned unequivocally into a project of socio-religious 
reform. For many Colombo Muslims who give alms to the poor on a regular basis 
zakat and sadaqa remain primarily concerned with the transformation of the (donor) 
self rather than with the long-term material and spiritual welfare of recipients.  That 
is, they are a means to discharge a religious obligation, accumulate religious merits 
and ensure success in one’s economic endeavours.28 
Here we do not intend to draw the lines of a hard and fast opposition between the 
demotic practices of popular Islam and the universalist orthodoxy of Islamic 
reformism.29  After all the vast majority of donors amongst our respondents shared the 
view that almsgiving should foster long-term economic development and discourage 
dependency, and all strived to lead the moral life appropriate to God-fearing Muslims.  
Instead we simply foreground the complexity and plurality of understandings of 
everyday practices of religious giving amongst Colombo Muslims.   
The spaces and places of Muslim charity  
Waseer Watta30 (a pseudonym) is a small administrative sub-division in the north-east 
of Maradana, one of the more down-at-heel areas of north-central Colombo 
notoriously associated with excessive consumption of alcohol and illegal drugs, and 
more generally for a plethora of ‘underworld activities.’ Waseer Watta, like Maradana 
and north Colombo area, is primarily Muslim, with around 60 per cent of the 
population registering in the latest census as either ‘Sri Lankan Moor’ or ‘Malay 
Muslim,’ the majority defining themselves as Moor31. The remainder are Sinhala 
Buddhists, Catholics, and Evangelical Christians. The community comprises of 25 
encroached ‘houses’32 and 160 National Housing Scheme (NHS) flats across 11 
blocks.  The NHS flats were built in the late 1980s to early 1990s by the United 
National Party government of Ranasinghe Premadasa, space for which was made by 
clearing existing slum dwellings and rehousing families in the blocks. One block is 
known locally as the ‘luxury flats’, larger than the standard apartments in the rest of 
the blocks. Residents say there are three classes of housing in the watte: the luxury 
flats, which are ‘class one,’ the remaining majority of the NHS flats, which are ‘class 
two,’ and the remaining encroached houses, which are ‘class three.’  
                                                        
28 Osella ‘“A Poor Muslim”’. 
29
 See e.g. V. De Munck, ‘Islamic Orthodoxy and Sufism in Sri Lanka,’ Anthropos, vol. 100, no. 2, 
2005, pp. 401-14.  For a critique of this binarism, see F. Osella and C. Osella, ‘Introduction: Islamic 
reformism in South Asia’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 42, nos. 2-3, 2008, pp. 247-257.  See also F. 
Haniffa, ‘Piety as politics amongst Muslim women in contemporary Sri Lanka’, Modern Asian Studies, 
vol. 42, nos. 2-3, 2008, pp. 347-375.   
30 In Sinhala, ‘Watta’ or ‘watte’ means ‘garden’ and is used to denote encroached slums and/or 
‘underserved settlements’ in urban areas. Reflecting local practice, we use two spellings of ‘Watta’ in 
this paper. We use the formal ‘Watta’ when referring to the community by its name (i.e. Waseer Watta) 
but the vernacular ‘watte’ when referring to the community generally. 
31
 Sri Lankan Moors constitute the country’s largest Muslim community, and claims descent from Arab 
traders who settled in Sri Lanka from the mediaeval period. The Malay Muslim community originated 
from South-East Asia and settled in the island during the Dutch and British colonial periods.. Ali ‘The 
genesis of the Muslim community’; Mahroof, ‘Community of Sri Lankan Malays’; Qadri ‘Unmooring 
identity’; McGilvray ‘Arabs, Moors and Muslims’; Nuhman, Sri Lankan Muslims. 
32
 ‘Encroached’ communities are simply those located on government or private land not belonging to 
the residents, and which have no planning permission or legal entitlements to remain. By other terms 
encroachments would refer to ‘slums’ or ‘shanties’, although those terms are not commonly used in Sri 
Lanka. 
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The ethnic and class stratification of the Muslim inhabitants is objectified in their 
accommodation arrangements, which in turn impacts upon the charitable activities of 
people in the watte. Thus residents of the ‘first class’ luxury flats all claim to give 
zakat at Ramadan as required by their economic level; very few residents of class two 
flats do so, and none of those in class three encroachments. By contrast, none of those 
in first class flats claim to receive charity from others, while the majority of those in 
class two flats, and all of those in class three encroachments do so.  Importantly, 
however, people in class two and three housing complain that class one residents 
ignore their neighbours in the watte, and do not give them charity, even at Ramadan.   
We note that none of the wealthy Muslims who give zakat in the neighbourhood are 
natives of Waseer Watta.  Of the five most active donors, three reside elsewhere and 
two lodge in the watte on a temporary basis. The ways in which they imagine their 
connections with and responsibilities to the local Muslim residents informs the 
calculations they make on what and to whom to give, and, as we shall see, the 
responses of recipients.    
Finally, the inhabitants of class two and three housing also receive welfare support 
from a wide range of organisations and individuals, from the central government and 
the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC), to an array of secular and religious voluntary 
organisations and philanthropists of various stripes.  Crucially, although the watte is a 
space of considerable charitable intervention, its working class and often of modest 
means, if not altogether poor inhabitants are actively engaged in various modalities of 
charitable giving.    
 
Giving charity in Waseer Watta 
Take Jameer, 42, a businessman who runs a chain of hardware stores, Orabi Traders, 
along with his five brothers.  We are introduced to Jameer by the trustees of the local 
mosque as ‘someone who gives zakat.’ Jameer has a close-cropped beard and is 
dressed in a smart black shirt and trouser set, and is described as a well-known figure 
in the local community deeply involved in the development of the mosque and its 
activities through the use of money he makes through Orabi Traders and other 
ventures. Throughout our interview, which appropriately enough is held in the office 
of the Waseer Watta mosque, Jameer is keen to share his knowledge of the scripture 
relating to zakat and sadaqa  and the mosque trustee defers to him on several points of 
detail relating to the economic, social, and moral calculations of charity that he 
makes. In this sense Jameer resembles many wealthy Muslim businessmen who 
appear to invest a very high level of time and energy in the calculation and giving of 
zakat in the pursuit of ‘social mindedness’ (Osella & Osella 2009).  
Jameer was born in Akurana, a Muslim town in the Kandy District, where some of his 
brothers still reside. Orabi Traders was started by Jameer’s father in the 1980s and 
when he was still alive he took responsibility for distributing zakat and sadaqa  based 
on company assets, while the brothers each gave from personal assets.  Jameer 
describes his father as a very pious man who was deeply involved in charitable works, 
right up until the time of his death, ‘when he was 77 he personally went and gave 
houses to one hundred tsunami victims,’ Jameer explains. For Jameer, his father’s 
lessons in business and charity, as intimately related activities, have been a founding 
principle of his life. So when the father died and the brothers assumed control of the 
company, each continued to combine the pursuit of business and charity and they 
calculate zakat based on what they individually own in the company, while still 
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calculating how much to give based on personal assets. When zakat based on 
company assets is given, the brothers generally agree together how much this should 
be and who should receive, but when they give from personal assets they usually 
decide alone.  
Social calculations—to whom to give—are complex.  For both company and personal 
zakat the brothers look to give to the categories of beneficiary as they understand are 
defined in zakat canon, “depending on their proportion in the community.”  For 
Jameer this translates into four main categories of recipients: company employees, so 
they can build or improve their home (this initiative was started by his father and is 
carried on by all the brothers); the Baithul Zakat committee in Akurana, which 
distributes according to its own rules, but tends to also focus on home building and 
improvements; poor relatives and other villagers in Akurana; and poor residents in 
Waseer Watta.  The poor in the ancestral village and the watte are given money to 
start a business, build or improve their home, or to marry off children.33  
Jameer’s spiritual calculations resemble those expressed by other successful traders, 
businessmen and professionals in Colombo.34 He explains that zakat does not belong 
to him but to those who are eligible to receive; as such it would be a sin not to give 
and failure to do so would incur grave misfortune in business and in life, and be met 
with punishment in the afterlife. “If you give your property will be pure. It will be 
protected from disasters and all problems,” Jameer says. But he also regards his 
involvement in the watte facilitated by zakat as helping the community’s social, 
moral, and spiritual upliftment, indexed in particular by increased mosque attendance. 
For Jameer this is a key obligation his brother and he have acquired due to their 
economic position, 
We have a connection with people here [in Waseer Watta]. We are spreading a 
message to come and pray here [in the Waseer Watta mosque]…When you 
have this much money you have to help them. 
Jameer further explains that zakat can directly help to alleviate the economic and 
social problems that ravage communities like Waseer Watta. By helping men and 
women to become self-sufficient—for example by starting a business, driving a 
trishaw, becoming a seamstress – or helping families to avoid getting into debt when 
children marry, zakat can reduce the flow of fathers, and especially mothers to the 
Gulf states as migrant workers, which is generally regarded as leading to low levels of 
education and “drug addiction” amongst Muslim youth. The moral obligation that 
compels Jameer to give is extended to recipients as a moral responsibility to improve 
themselves through the pursuit of more social and religious-minded behaviours, at the 
centre of which stands the safeguard of women’s modesty and mosque attendance.  
He feels beholden to Waseer Watta because it is a poor community in close vicinity of 
one of his business outlets and adjacent to the mosque in which he usually prays. At 
the same time, Jameer’s confabulations about the requirements and scope of zakat 
reflects his support for Tablighi Jama’at’s efforts to reawaken Islam amongst 
Muslims. 
                                                        
33
 Jameer’s brothers, meanwhile, may also give to these categories and more. For example, one brother 
living in Akurana has joined forces with friends to create an informal organization that pools a part of 
their zakat which is then given to help widows start their own businesses so they will not feel 
compelled to take a second husband. 
34 Osella ‘“A Poor Muslim”’.  
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Jameer’s charitable endeavour and high aspirations are tempered in less well-off zakat 
givers in the watte. Thajun, 43, is an announcer on Sri Lankan Broadcasting Company 
radio programmes in Tamil. He lodges in a second-class flat given over to rent by the 
owners, which he shares with his brother, who works in a middle-management 
position in the Ministry of Education, and two other men.  Educated at secondary 
school level, Thajun is married but his wife and two children live in Ampara, his natal 
town on the east coast of the island.  We meet Thajun in his flat. He is sat behind a 
small desk rehearsing some radio scripts, and is pleased of the chance to take a break 
to talk about zakat and Islamic charity.  Thajun explains that he has lived in Waseer 
Watta for just over one year, and during Ramadan he gave zakat to some poor 
neighbours he had come to know, as well as to beggars who knocked at his door. But 
he also gives zakat to people in Ampara, as well as to a mosque committee and 
community development organisations active in some remote Muslim villages in the 
Ampara District.  Thajun explains his charitable endeavour with reference to what he 
understands as the to be the appropriate ways of giving zakat in the Quran, 
If you go by the correct order then you give first to family, then beggars, then 
organisations…Organisations include normal village groups, like a social work 
group that goes and looks at the needs of the people and try to respond to them. 
For Thajun, however, the zakat he gives to the mosque committee and development 
organisations is reckoned to be more effective than that which he distributes directly. 
And so he criticises those Muslims who insist on giving zakat personally, for whom a 
close relationship with beneficiaries and the possibility to control where their own 
money goes is considered of prime importance,  
Zakat committees identify the needs of the poorest communities. At the end of 
Ramazan they produce a report of who donated and what the money was used 
for. If you give to beggars who come to the door you can give money but it’s 
not really beneficial. So it’s better if an organisation does it. But some people 
demand an intimate relationship with beneficiaries… 
Other wealthy Waseer Watta residents, though, feel hardly any responsibility to the 
neighbourhood. The watte rarely figures in their zakat calculations, and they prefer 
instead to give charity solely in their natal villages in which they maintain a strong 
sense of belonging.  Nimis, a 42 years old medical doctor, lives with his wife in one 
of the ‘luxury’ flats in the watte.  But he spends most of the week in his native 
Kalmuni on the east coast of Sri Lanka where he owns some land and a house, and 
where he runs a private medical practice.  Nimis’ wife Janas explains that they 
calculate zakat according to the value of their house and land on the east coast, and 
then give the amount to a mosque in Kalmunai.  Like Thajun, Janas says they prefer 
to give to the mosque rather than directly to deserving people because they only have 
a small amount to offer, and this way what they give, “can have more impact.”  She 
stresses the importance to calculate zakat correctly and to distribute it to rightful 
recipients, failure to do so would be meted out by God’s punishment, through a 
sudden drop in their future income, for instance. Janas explains,  
What we give is not a lot, it can’t change people’s lives. But if you give to the 
mosque they can collect from many people and change lives. The mosque 
committee knows the correct way of giving, and you can be sure that your 
money goes to the correct categories [of recipients]. 
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The narratives of our Waseer Watta respondents reflect the complex social and ethical 
reasoning underpinning the giving of zakat, and almsgiving more generally, which we 
have found amongst middle class Muslims in Colombo.35  Giving zakat affords the 
fulfilment of a religious obligation, and the cultivation of pious dispositions, an 
alignment of one’s life to God’s will and command which brings rewards in the 
everyday as much as in the afterlife.  But for some, it also entails the objectification of 
a duty of care for the material and spiritual welfare not only of those with whom 
exists a degree of familiarity, but also of the poor in the watte.  The stories of those 
who receive zakat reveal an equally complex reasoning, both in agreement with and 
dissenting from that of givers.   
Receiving charity in Waseer Watta 
Let us return to Jameer talking to us in the Waseer Watta mosque.  After he finishes 
speaking we are introduced to Hasim, who is described to us as “a poor man who 
received help from Orabi Traders.”  At the beginning of the interview both Jameer 
and the mosque trustee remain in the room and Hasim speaks in general terms about 
his life and the struggles that he faces and how the generosity of men like Jameer 
helped him through hard times. But when they leave Hasim starts to talk about the 
problems he experiences obtaining help from wealthy Muslims, zakat in particular.  
Hasim has a large family—wife, two daughters and five sons— and feels the 
economic burden intensely. The oldest child is married and has left home; one son has 
finished education but is unemployed; and the remainder are still in school. Hasim 
used to work as a daily-wage labourer for a mason, but he was forced to quit after an 
accident. For a while he drove a trishaw, but the daily rent of Rs. 350 he had to pay to 
hire the vehicle was too high, he rarely broke even let alone made a profit.  Nowadays 
Hasim assembles handbags from home for a local shop, working on a piece-rate of 
Rs. 100 per bag, completing on average two or three bags per day.  He explains that 
although his income is insufficient to provide for his family’s daily needs, forcing him 
to take loans from local money-lenders to make ends meet, he has “too much läjja 
[shame]” to ask for help from men like Jameer.  When wealthy businessmen come to 
the watte at Ramadan to give zakat outside the Mosque, he won’t even send his own 
wife as he doesn’t want her to “queue and beg.”  Hasim finds fault both with the ways 
in which zakat is distributed—normally going to the ‘very poor’ already known to the 
giver, or to the latter’s relatives and acquaintances—and in how potential recipients 
are required to demand zakat.  Hasim recognises that although zakat is an obligation 
to give and a right for the poor to receive, in practice things do not work that way. He 
explains, 
Although it [zakat] belongs to the poor you shouldn’t ask. They [the 
donors] should think and give. But they are giving priority to relatives and 
the very poor. Many people are coming to help but only if we know them 
personally will they come to us. Then the problem is that people who 
don’t get [zakat] will create issues and so they [the givers] might get fed 
up and leave this community. 
The one exception Hasim remembers is when his eldest daughter reached 
marriageable age and he had no money or savings to buy her jewellery and pay for the 
                                                        
35 Osella ‘“A Poor Muslim”’; Osella et al. ‘Charity, Philanthropy and Development’.  See also T. 
Widger, ‘Philanthronationalism: Junctures at the Business–Charity Nexus in Post฀war Sri Lanka,’ 
Development and Change, vol. 47, no. 1, 2016, pp.29-50. 
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wedding.  He went to speak to the mosque administration and they told him they 
could “match him up with someone who gives zakat.” The mosque gave him the 
details of Orabi Traders, whom a female relative then contacted on his behalf.  Orabi 
Traders responded by giving Hasim some jewellery—including a gold chain—and 
sponsored the wedding meal.  Hasim suggests that zakat could give him the resources 
to develop his handbag business or to buy a trishaw, the chance to earn a decent 
living.  But he doesn’t foresee this ever happening. 
Other respondents reinforce Hasim’s pessimism.  Fifty-three years old, Muzamil is 
married to Fazlia who is five years younger than him, the couple earn around Rs. 600 
per day between them. Muzamil drives a trishaw and Fazlia cooks food for local 
eateries.36 Muzamil explains that every Ramadan two former Waseer Watta residents 
distribute zakat from the mosque: one handing out Rs. 2000 notes, and the other 
dispensing dry rations (rice, sugar, milk powder, flour) from the back of a truck.  
While Muslims and non-Muslim residents of the watte queue to collect the donations, 
neither his wife nor he do so. The problem, Muzamil suggests, is that,  
There are some very wealthy Muslim men who come at Ramadan and give 
money next to the mosque, but I don’t take. But if someone comes to my 
doorstep then I will take. I don’t want to stand in queues, it is shameful. 
When interviewed Muzamil had a daughter who was about to marry, and like Hasim 
this was causing him some concern. Not wishing to go cap in hand to the mosque or 
to wealthy Muslims he didn’t know personally, Muzamil was, as he put it, “constantly 
going to ask relatives for money.”  This was something Muzamil thought he could do 
because his relatives were ‘close to [his] level’, and he could reciprocate at a later 
date. For Muzamil, then, the nature of the relationship he has with a would-be-giver 
defines the degree of (moral and status) apprehension experienced by asking for zakat 
and other forms of help. 
Alongside recounting personal experiences of receiving zakat and the moral dilemmas 
that often come with it, Waseer Watta Muslims were also concerned with those who 
appeared in the neighbourhood during the month of Ramadan and extended charity in 
a haphazard way. Two somewhat ephemeral and unnamed characters did exactly so 
because of a past connection with the watte. As young men they had migrated to 
Colombo from the east coast, Waseer Watta was the first place they lived in the 
capital, lodging in spare rooms and bunking up with friends. In time they both became 
successful gem traders and moved away, but every year they return to distribute cash 
from the steps of the mosque to a queue of women.  Poor Muslims in the watte have 
mixed feelings about this.  They spoke of the shame it brings to the community, 
making local people look and feel like common beggars. Some argued that these two 
donors did not even bother to ascertain whether the recipients were actual Muslims or 
not, insisting that some of their Sinhala and Tamil neighbours would don hijab and 
masquerade as Muslim women to receive zakat. Yet others embraced the inclusivity 
of this somewhat indiscriminate form of giving, arguing that through their largesse the 
two former residents of the watte are helping to maintain good relations between 
watte residents of different ethnic-religious communities.  
Charity given and received  
                                                        
36
 Fazlia’s operation is larger than most of these home-based catering industries common across 
Colombo wattes: she works from a kitchen set up in the front room of their modest flat, and is assisted 
by her daughter as well as Muzamil when he’s not out looking for hires. 
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Charity received from wealthy Muslims, and zakat especially, features large in poor 
Muslims’ stories of help they receive. At its best zakat is reckoned to have real 
transformative potential, but in every instance investigated only small amounts of 
assistance were ever extended. However, charity from wealthy Muslims constitutes 
only an irregular source of help.  In the everyday that which is given by relatives, 
neighbours, and friends who are closer to one’s own economic standing is ultimately 
more predictable and of more benefit.  As such, the vast majority of our poor Muslim 
interlocutors in Waseer Watta give as well as receive. 
For Muzamil, who we have met earlier, giving sadaqa  (voluntary almsgiving) is an 
important part of being a Muslim. For him giving has little to do with social welfare 
or community upliftment, it is about obtaining merits from God. Muzamil tells us that 
with his modest daily income of Rs 600 he is an ēḻai aḷ (poor man) but he is not 
totally destitute as a pichchaikkāraṉ (beggar), and so he can give to those who are 
poorer than him. He also stresses the importance of not boasting about one’s 
generosity, echoing the popular refrain that, “the left hand should not know what the 
right had is doing.” 
Whenever I give to the poor I think about getting merits from God. I always 
taught my wife and children to give without others seeing. You’ll get more 
blessings if you don’t just give for society. It’s not a social duty. I think about 
God. That’s why it’s best not to be seen giving charity. 
Although Muzamil prefers to ask relatives for help because he can give them 
something in return, when he gives he likes to do so without reciprocity.  
I don’t expect anything in return from my brothers if I give them something. 
Even if they are millionaires I wouldn’t expect anything in return. It doesn’t 
matter if they’re relatives or not, it’s about God. We are God-fearing people! 
One category of people that Muzamil refuses to give to, however, is beggars. Like 
many Muslims in Waseer Watta, he considers beggars to be a menace who trouble 
hard-working folk with their endless demands.37 Running a food business means 
Muzamil has more beggars on his doorstep than most, and he finds himself chasing 
them away. Only at Ramadan does Muzamil break this rule, when, he says, it is bad to 
turn people away who ask for help. 
Muzamil’s daughter Shafeena is 29 years old, and lives in the flat next door to her 
parents’. She married Majeed in 2001, and they have two young children.  Educated 
to Grade 6, Shafeena is a housewife, but also helps her mother prepare food; Majeed 
was educated to Grade 10, and works as an agent for an overseas recruitment 
company. Although Majeed earns only Rs.15000 per month, the couple like to give 
sadaqa on a regular basis.  Like her father, Shafeena believes that charity should be 
given discretely and without “showing off.”  Indeed, as a household with a small 
income, giving charity could be construed as an attempt to distinguish themselves 
from equally poor neighbours, of acting above their “level.” Shafeena describes 
giving sadaqa as a religious obligation, one that is best discharged individually and 
directly to recipients, because even the mosque might misappropriate what they 
collect, 
It’s our religious obligation to give. We might not trust the mosque as they 
might be using the money for other things. But God knows we’re giving it. 
                                                        
37 Osella ‘“A Poor Muslim”’ 
 15 
However Shafeena also distinguishes charity given to non-relatives from charity 
given to relatives.  Both entail moral commitments, but the former is an obligation to 
God, whilst the latter is embedded in kinship responsibilities. She explains,   
Husband sends money to his family. He sees this as an obligation because 
she’s his mother. Your mother raised you so it’s like something you have to 
do. It’s a sin if you don’t do it but it’s more for the love you have for your 
mother. 
In this family, then, charity is thought about and practiced along lines of both piety 
and relationality, seeking to avoid publicity or supporting unworthy recipients. 
However, for Saleem and Rizana, a couple living in encroached housing, beggars are 
deemed worthy recipients for their charity.  Saleem works in a factory and Rizana is a 
housewife, and they have six children to support on a meagre income.  Rizana 
explains that they give sadaqa at Ramadan in the form of raw rice to people who 
come to the door and ask; and sadaqa as cash to beggars at other times of year.  
Compared with the normative rules regulating the calculation and distribution of 
zakat—which they are anyway too poor to give—for Rizana the fact that any action 
conducted with the intention of helping others can constitute sadaqa means that even 
poor households can engage in pious as well as humanitarian deeds.   
This is a stance that we have found across many Muslim households in Waseer Watta, 
where those living on the edge of destitution give whatever they can when they can.  
In a second class flat we meet Wazeer and Mazly.  Wazeer, a trishaw driver, was 
educated to Grade 8 and Mazly didn’t receive any schooling at all.  She is a 
housewife, but like many poor women in the watte she also makes food to sell to a 
local eatery. Combined, they can earn no more than Rs.1500 per day. Like other poor 
Muslim households they receive fitra at the end of Ramadan,38 and also sadaqa  from 
various sources throughput the year, but have never received zakat.  Although 
themselves in receipt of fitra and in need of help, at the end of Ramadan Wazeer and 
Mazly also like to give fitra—rice, milk powder, sugar, and tea—“to people who 
don’t have.” Mazly explains,  
In the month of Ramadan we get and we give also. If someone comes and says 
they have nothing to eat, then we give at any time. Why do we do this? We are 
searching for blessings. If we give, we get! 
Poor Muslims in Waseer Watta who give sadaqa  and fitra deploy a complex and 
diverse economic, social, and spiritual reasoning when doing so. For some giving 
sadaqa to strangers is a pious act, and one that is close to an obligation; at the same 
time giving assistance to relatives is not considered charity but a relational obligation. 
Across households we also encounter expressions of giving for humanitarian and 
social reasons, as part of a commitment to generalised notions of care for the 
unfortunate and destitute.  Indeed it is impossible to distinguish the motives of poor 
Muslims who give sadaqa  in terms of any one reason. Rather what we find are 
complex engagements with ethics of piety, relationality, and humanitarianism. 
Whether giving should engender either material or immaterial returns—giving to 
obtain blessings, or future success and social status—or indeed both, is a concern that 
is debated in the watte with regard to poor Muslims who give zakat. 
                                                        
38
 Distribution of charity, especially food items, on Eid-ul-Fitr, the day that marks the end of Ramadan 
fasting. 
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While most poor Muslims in Waseer Watta frame their charitable activities as sadaqa, 
some define it as zakat.  Predictably, mosque trustees, as well as wealthy men like 
Jameer campaign against the use of the term zakat to describe poor Muslim’s 
charitable endeavours.  For them, this transgression of Islamic orthopraxy—the 
obligation of zakat should fall only on Muslims whose surplus wealth (nisab) held for 
a full lunar year exceeds a specified level—is explained as ignorance of Islamic 
doctrines and practices that the mosque can rectify through sermons and education. 
Nevertheless poor Muslims who claim to give zakat are steadfast in their 
interpretation of their actions, and when pushed counter any argument that is raised 
against them. There are several possible understandings of what is taking place here, 
ranging from a lack of religious knowledge as the mosque would insist, to a cynical  
attempt to appropriate the social status associated to giving zakat.  Alongside these, 
however, stands our respondents’ insistence that poor Muslims can, and should be 
both givers and recipients of charity.  
Fayaz and Rizana, both in their early 40s, live in one of the most well maintained 
Corporation flats. Located on the ground floor, they have blocked off the door that 
opens onto the common landing.  They have opened an independent entrance to the 
flat that leads directly on a bit of land around which they have built a high wall. They 
are also the only residents in the block to have painted their exterior walls a different 
colour.  Inside the flat the floor is paved with polished tiles, and a modern steel-and-
glass table and chair-set are placed in the middle. Comfortable sofas and a coffee 
table are set opposite an expensive flat-screen television. Fayaz was educated to 
Grade 8 and Rizana to Grade 10. He works as a manager in a large Muslim-owned 
company, and until recently Rizana has worked in the Gulf.  Fayaz earns Rs.50,000 
per month, high by watte standards, but still too little to bring him into the level of 
wealth at which one should pay zakat, something that is affirmed by the fact that the 
family receives zakat from Fayaz’s employer at Ramadan. Nevertheless, Fayaz 
engages in a wide range of giving, some of which he defines as sadaqa and some as 
zakat. Alongside this Fayaz also gives to poorer relatives, described by him as zakat 
when given at Ramadan and as udavi (Tamil for help or assistance) when given at 
other times of the year.  
During Ramadan we give zakat to family members first and then after to non-
relatives. At other times of the year we give clothes and other items to 
different people [as sadaqa]. People come and ask for money for weddings. 
This is sadaqa . During the month of fasting, zakat is something you have to 
give. It’s a religious thing you have to do but it’s also something we like to do 
– it’s not a bother….But the help we give to family members [at other times] 
is not sadaqa or zakat. We see it as help.  
With their separate doorway, high walls, consumer goods, and managerial position, 
Fayaz and Rizana are social climbers interested in distinguishing themselves from 
their less fortunate neighbours. In that sense the claim to give zakat is easily 
understood as forming part of the same narrative of distinction. The giving of zakat, 
though, is possibly within their reach. Perhaps by acting as if they can give zakat 
today, tomorrow they might be able to.  Even so, Fayaz describes his zakat as being 
driven by piety, and in this sense he occupies the same social and moral space as men 
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like Jameer who see no contradiction between their business aspirations, and religious 
and humanitarian commitments.39 
For other Muslims in the watte the possibility of economic success seems remote, yet 
they still insist they can give zakat.  Mahood is 66 years old O-level educated man 
who works as an odd-job electrician and handyman, earning around Rs.300 per day.  
Mahood is also one of the few Muslims in the watte to collect government welfare 
payments, totalling around Rs.600 per month.  Mahood says he receives fitra from the 
mosque at Ramadan, and help from his mother-in-law’s relatives. He has a learned 
disposition, and as we sit in his flat he embarks on a monologue about the similarities 
between Islam and Christianity, which he sees as many.  This is a time of protests 
across the Muslim world against a film purportedly made in America that defames the 
life of the Prophet Mohammad. Tensions are also starting to run high in Colombo and 
Mahood wants to stress that both Islam and Christianity are religions founded on the 
principle of charity. For Mahood giving is a way of life, something that can and 
should promote harmony across communities, and a practice he has pursued since 
childhood.  Mahood is also keen to stress that he gives according to the principles of 
zakat as well as of sadaqa . He differentiates between that which he calculates as a 
percentage of his income and can only be given to Muslims (zakat), and that which 
can be any amount and can be given freely (sadaqa). For Mahood, however, the 
ability to give zakat is not reckoned in material terms but spiritual terms. Thus the 
opportunity to give zakat, to give to less fortunate Muslims at the most auspicious 
time of year, Ramadan, cannot be reduced to an economic demand, but is something 
that all good Muslims should be aware of regardless of their economic level.  Mahood 
challenges the requirement of having in excess of Rs. 500,000 in untouched assets in 
order to be under obligation to give zakat,  
Even as a small child we had to give. It’s a religious obligation. We have to 
give to people below our level. Is it zakat? Even if you only have ten rupees 
you can give two-and-a-half per cent!’ 
Mahood’s assertion that he can give zakat “even if you only have ten rupees!” is 
joyful, expressing a deep pleasure in the capacity to do so. For Mahood, giving zakat 
is a choice and not merely a duty.  There is little to suggest that Mahood associates 
zakat with either economic success or the pursuit of ‘social mindedness.’  Here giving 
is an act entirely distinct from other considerations beyond fulfilling God’s command, 
and performed spontaneously.40  
Conclusions: charity and the problem of ‘the poor’ 
The ethnography we discussed emphasizes the heterogeneity of Muslim charity in 
contemporary Colombo, whereby different orientations and practices not only co-
exist, but actually work through each other.41 We note that whilst the vast majority of 
our respondents would agree that coordinated and centrally collected charity might be 
more effective, many feel a commitment to supporting individuals or families with 
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whom one has long-term personal relations, be them relatives, employees, former 
clients or simply poor neighbours in the ancestral village. This might be more explicit 
and evident in the case of those who prefer to distribute in person at least a share of 
their zakat.  But the various projects or schemes of formal and informal charitable 
organizations follow similar geographical trajectories, whereby donations in kind or 
cash tend to move from Colombo to the donors’ natal or ancestral villages, 
reproducing long-term commitments and relational obligations.  Individual donors 
and organizations continue to give zakat and sadaqa , in whatever form is distributed, 
to those with whom they have long-term relations.  This is seldom rationalised with 
reference to the categories of rightful recipients of zakat mentioned in the Qur’an and 
Islamic canon.42 More commonly our respondents referred to an ethico-religious duty 
of care for those who, for a variety of reasons, cannot make ends meet and have to 
depend on others for the necessities of everyday life, described in the Qur’an as 
fuqara (sing. faqir).  Materialised by giving zakat and sadaqa, such a duty of care 
should expand from one’s kin and relatives, to dependants and neighbours, and 
eventually to the wider community along a vector of decreasing intimacy and 
relational obligations.   
If it is normally accepted that giving to those to whom one is closest is the most 
efficient and effective way to take care of those in need,43 we have found an increased 
concern about “poor people” (Tamil ēḻai makkaḷ), a relationally more distant category 
of persons whose spontaneous demands for help and assistance are nowadays 
stereotyped, and reproved as akin to begging (Tamil pichchai eṭu).   The pedagogy of 
charity articulated by many of Colombo’s (formal and informal) Muslim charities, as 
well by the followers of Islamic reformist organizations is specifically directed to 
transforming not only spiritual and material well-being, but also the cultural and 
social dispositions of the socially and relationally distant, and hence unknown and 
anonymous poor.  Here, individually selected, scrutinised and assessed by 
organizations standing for an anonymised body of givers, “the poor” are turned from 
nameless bodies through whom a religious obligation is discharged into knowable and 
known objects of moral scrutiny and intervention.  In the meantime, the beggar 
(Tamil pichchaikkāraṉ) is increasingly seen as a nuisance, bothering respectable 
households with incessant demands and giving a bad name to the Muslim community. 
Moreover, one can never be certain whether the beggar is genuinely indigent or a 
‘professional’ mendicant making good money out of fellow Muslims’ compassion 
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and piety.  To boot, rumours abound of non-Muslims putting on a skullcap to beg for 
money from Muslim houses or shops.  That is, the morally threatening and unruly 
beggar—the wretched miskin appearing in the Qur’an as an ambiguous stranger 
deserving of privileged charitable attention44—is tamed through bureaucratic 
practices—application forms, letters of recommendation nowadays routinely 
demanded by donors—which deny mendicants the power to eliciting donations by 
appealing to the ‘impulse to give’ of the Muslim public.45 However, as we have 
argued elsewhere, attempts to erase beggars from the practices of almsgiving are 
interrupted every time a someone gives to mendicants knowing that money given as 
alms will return multiplied. 46 . 
Waseer Watta’s poor residents’ refusal to stand in queues to receive zakat might be 
interpreted as the expression of a wider South Asian awareness of the hierarchies of 
status produced and reproduced through the politics unreciprocated gift giving.  And 
yet the shame they experience is not just the humiliation of demanding and receiving 
assistance from others, but the realization that eliciting support from strangers is 
nowadays unescapably marked by the indignity of begging.  The well-meaning and 
pious Muslim donor who forces the watte’s poor to queue “like beggars” to receive 
zakat is well aware of the differences between ēḻai aḷ (poor man) and pichchaikkāraṉ 
(beggar).  And yet, he acts as he does because in contemporary middle class and 
Islamic reformist discourse those who demand charity and receive it in person and 
publicly by individual donors are perceived and represented as ‘beggars.’  In turn, the 
conflation of the practices of the poor into begging calls for and justifies the work of 
purification47 enacted by charities and individuals through the introduction of 
bureaucratic procedures and the articulation socio-religious pedagogies of upliftment.  
That is, once the relationally distant poor have been turned to the categorical status of 
beggars, in order to become the object of charitable intervention they have to be 
reassembled into deserving poor.   
Waseer Watta’s residents, though, are keen to point out that donations handed out by 
individuals or organizations are never enough to provide a degree of social protection 
for those whose livelihood is at the best precarious.  Eventually the financial help 
extended by kin, friends and neighbours is more easily accessible and reliable.  
Moreover, by claiming the right to give as well as to receive religious charity, and by 
drawing attention to the continuity between the ethics of almsgiving and the morality 
of relational obligations, Waseer Watta’s residents assert participation to a 
‘community of believers’ constituted at the intersection of two related modalities of 
reciprocity: reciprocity to God via pious acts of charity, reciprocity to fellow residents 
and kin via relations of mutuality and co-dependence. By receiving and giving sadaqa 
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and zakat, poor and working class Muslim in the watte, then, imagine inclusion and 
belonging to the wider Muslim community in Colombo which is not contingent upon 
the mediation and pedagogical interventions of charitable organizations and (middle-
class) pious donors. Importantly, this imagination of inclusion and belonging comes at 
a time when the Muslim poor are increasingly marginalized by virtue of a discourse 
which by framing charity as a means “to help the poor to help themselves” has turned 
socio-economic upliftment into an ethical duty, and, consequently, failure to improve 
oneself has become the symptom of wider moral and religious shortcomings.48 
It is precisely at this intersection that we find fertile ground for a reconsideration of 
charity, not just in terms of understanding the lives of the poor who receive but also 
the poor who give.  There has been a growing interest in recent years in the 
motivation of the ‘humanitarian poor’: the argument simply stated is that feelings of 
affinity with other poor people leads the poor themselves to give charitably whatever 
and whenever they can.49  In our Waseer Watta ethnography we find not just evidence 
of sympathy for the fellow poor but an opportunity to express and embody piety and 
community through the gifting of charity to family, friends, and neighbours. Yet 
while for wealthy men like Jameer this does involve an attempt to refashion the moral 
lives of the poor, for impoverished men like Mahood, giving is understood as an 
action undertaken in and for itself alone, devoid of moral demands on the recipients. 
By making this argument we do not wish to romanticise the charity of the poor, nor to 
naively position it as the antithesis of a hegemonic charity of the wealthy middle 
classes. Instead, by exploring the charity of the poor in and through their life-worlds, 
we wish to highlight how, at least for some Waseer Watta people, giving charity 
offers a chance to stand apart from the normative pedagogies of what Atia defines as 
pious neoliberalism.50 The poor give not simply because of the debts of mutuality51 to 
which they are beholden as the residents of tight-knit communities, nor the strategies 
of aspirational social climbers intent on distinguishing themselves from poor kin and 
neighbours. As our ethnography has shown, these and complex other motivations lead 
the poor to give, through modalities at times analogous and at other times dissimilar 
to the wealthy.  
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